Janet Peterson v. Sunrider Corp. Sunrider, International, Tei Fu Chen : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Janet Peterson v. Sunrider Corp. Sunrider,
International, Tei Fu Chen : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
H. Thomas Stevenson; Brad C. Smith; Stevenson & Smith, PC; Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellees.
Thomas W. Seiler; Ryan T. Peel; Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC; Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Janet Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., Sunrider, International, Tei Fu Chen, No. 20040116 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4798
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANET PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER, 
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU 
CHEN, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20040116-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
H. Thomas Stevenson 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, PC 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Ryan T. Peel 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo,Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801)375-1920 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 13 2004 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANET PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER, 
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU 
CHEN, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
H. Thomas Stevenson 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, PC 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Case No. 20040116-CA 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Ryan T. Peel 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo,Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 1 
Point 1 1 
Even With Defendants' Counterclaim Dismissed, the Trial Court Still 
Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing Plaintiffs Case for Failure to 
Prosecute. 
Point II 6 
Plaintiffs Argument is Not Frivolous Within the Meaning of Ut. R. 
App. P. 40 and Sanctions are Inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 8 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: Cited on Pagefs) 
Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day. 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981) 8 
Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969) 4 
Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah Dept. of Health. 
851 P.2d 1212 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) 4 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co.v. Robbins. 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) 4 
Grundman v. Williams & Peterson. 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984) 4 
Hartford Lease Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) 1 
Ford v. Sharp. 758 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1985) 4 
Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 99, 17 P.2d 1110 6 
K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) 1 
Lundahl v. Ouinn. 2003 UT 11, 67 P.3d 1000) 8 
Maxfield v. Rushton. 
779 P.2d 237 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) . . . 1, 2,4, 5 
Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) 8 
Rohan v. Boseman. 2002 UT App 106, 46 P.3d 753 1 
Romandette v. Weetabix Co.. 807 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1986) 2 
Rogers v. Kroger Co.. 669 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1982) 3 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) 1 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) 1,4 
4 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court Rules: 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 9 7 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33 6 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 40 6 
in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. Even With Defendants' Counterclaim Dismissed, the Trial Court 
Still Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing Plaintiffs Case for Failure to 
Prosecute. 
Defendants' counsel correctly points out that in the trial court's Order dated March 
30,2000 and entered on March 31,2000 the Defendants' counterclaim was dismissed by 
the trial court. However, even with the Defendants' counterclaim dismissed, the trial court 
still abused its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs case for failure to prosecute where 
neither party pursued this case for nearly one year. 
In analyzing any dismissal for failure to prosecute, the five factors must be 
considered: (1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move 
the case forward; (3) what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what 
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side by the party's delay; and (5), 
most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 
P.2d 237 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) citing K.L.C. Inc. v. 
McLean. 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) and Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 
1977). The trial court's discretion in determining whether to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute "'must be balanced against' the priority of'affording disputants an opportunity 
to be heard and to do justice between them.'" Rohan v. Boseman. 2002 UT App 106, f^ 28, 
46 P.3d 753, quoting Maxfield. 779 P.2d at 239 and Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 554 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). Even without 
i 
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considering the Defendants' counterclaim, the trial court still abused its discretion in 
dismissing the Plaintiffs case. 
a. The conduct, opportunity and accomplishments of both parties. 
The first three Maxfield factors requires this Court to examine each party's actions 
or inactions, the opportunity each party had to move the case along, as well as the overall 
conduct of the parties. In reviewing both the Defendants5 and the Plaintiffs actions, it 
appears that substantial discovery occurred throughout this case, albeit before the 
Plaintiffs appeal to the Utah Supreme Court in 2000. This extensive discovery process 
included the Plaintiff taking numerous depositions in California, as well as many written 
discovery requests, which were subject to several motions to compel. Indeed, at the July 
8,2002 hearing before Judge Claudia Laycock, Plaintiffs counsel stated "there is a lot of 
discovery that was done almost five years ago..." (Brief of Appellees, Exhibit E, p. 6). 
Thus, both parties completed substantial discovery before the Plaintiff s appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court in 2000. In interpreting the corresponding federal rule, some courts may 
excuse a delay in prosecuting an action when the plaintiff has been otherwise diligent. 
Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1986). In the present action, the 
Plaintiff has been diligently pursuing her claim for several years, and a nearly one year 
delay should not cause her entire claim to be dismissed. 
The Defendants attempt to portray the time incurred in the appeals process as 
further delay of Plaintiff prosecuting her case. However, federal courts have also found 
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that only delay which are attributable to the plaintiff should be considered in deciding a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 312, 317 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
While this case was filed in 1996, a motion for summary judgment was granted in 
June, 1998. During that time, the Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing discovery, including 
the numerous California depositions. The Plaintiff appealed that decision but because it 
was not a final order, the appeal was dismissed on December 15,1998. Therefore, because 
of a dismissed appeal, a six month time period elapsed because of the timing of the 
appellate courts. When the trial court was finally able to enter a finalized order granting 
the June, 1998 motion for summary judgment, which order was entered on March 31, 
2000, the Plaintiff again sought an appeal in April, 2000. Again, because of the timing of 
the appellate process, this case was not ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court until April 
26, 2002, and remitted to the trial court in May, 2002. Because of a successful appeal, the 
Plaintiffs case was delayed for over two years. The time elapsed during these two appeals 
processes, over two and a half years, should not be characterized as the Plaintiffs fault in 
further delaying the prosecution of this case. What is only before this Court is the nearly 
one year period of time from July, 2002 to August, 2003; any other period of delay cannot 
be attributed to the Plaintiff. 
Utah case law has demonstrated that the time period for delay regarding a dismissal 
of a case for failure to prosecute is a much larger length of time than the mere one year in 
3 
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this matter. Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247,461 P.2d 464 (1969) (a 
period of five and a half years), Grundman v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 
1984) (a period of four years), Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (a period of five years), and Crystal Lime & 
Cement Co.v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) (a period over eight years). 
The period where this matter has sat idle is merely one year and has not been a sufficient 
time whereby the trial court could have found that the Plaintiff has failed to prosecute her 
claims. 
B. The prejudice to the Defendant by the Plaintiffs one year delay. 
The fourth Maxfield factor which this Court must consider is what prejudice may 
have been caused to the Defendants by the Plaintiffs one year delay. See also 
Westinghouse, 544 P.2d 876 . A federal court, interpreting the corresponding federal rule, 
has held that a dismissal for failure to prosecute would be improper when the defendant 
made no claim of prejudice by the delay. Ford v. Sharp. 758 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
In the present case, the Defendants never claimed nor provided any evidence to the 
trial court that they were prejudiced by the Plaintiffs one year delay. The Defendants 
argue that "Defendant is a corporation and many of the witnesses who were present prior 
to the first appeal in 1998, have sought other employment in the intervening six years." 
(Brief of Appellees, p. 29). However, the Defendants never provided any evidence of its 
4 
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employees seeking other employment in the intervening six years. This Court does not 
have any evidence before it that the Defendants were prejudiced by the Plaintiffs one year 
delay—indeed, an examination of both the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute do not contain any evidence of prejudice. 
(R. 1755-1760, 1781-1784). Since there is no evidence of prejudice to the Defendants 
before this Court, this Court must conclude that there is no prejudice to the Defendant as 
a result of the one year delay. 
C. Injustice will result from the dismissal of the Plaintiffs case. 
The final, and most important Maxfield factor is whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal of the Plaintiffs claims. Maxfield. 779 P.2d at 239. The Plaintiff has 
diligently prosecuted her case for several years, conducting extensive written discovery, 
taking numerous depositions of the Defendants' out of state employees, filing and 
opposing motions for summary judgment, as well as availing herself of her right to appeal. 
This case has been ongoing for several years, whereby the Plaintiff has been prosecuting 
her claim during most of that time; the Plaintiffs claims should not be so summarily 
dismissed for the lapse of a short period of time, after such extensive discovery and 
successfully appealing a motion for summary judgment against her. Such action would 
be inherently unfair and serve as a great injustice to Plaintiff by not allowing her to bring 
5 
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her claims before the trial court, after such an exhaustive discovery phase and successful 
appellate litigation. 
II. Plaintiffs Argument is Not Frivolous Within the Meaning of Ut. R. 
App. P. 40 and Sanctions are Inappropriate. 
Defendants' contend that Plaintiffs argument on appeal is subject to sanctions by 
this Court pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 40(a), because Plaintiffs 
argument nhinges exclusively on her factual assertion that under applicable Utah case law, 
such a dismissal was improper where there was a pending counterclaim..." (Brief of 
Appellees, at 33). Defendants seek sanctions, specifically attorney's fees, for having to 
respond to such an argument when the Defendants dismissed their counterclaim before the 
Plaintiffs appeal to the Utah Supreme Court in 2000. However, as argued above, even 
with the Defendants' counterclaim dismissed, the trial court abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the Plaintiffs claims for failure to prosecute where the Plaintiffs delay was 
only a one year period in an action which has been ongoing since 1996 and which has been 
at the appellate level for over two and a half years (not including this appeal) and where 
no evidence of prejudice was presented by the Defendants. Under Rule 40(a), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure 33, is referenced, which allows this Court to award damages for 
the presentation of a frivolous appeal. 'Frivolous' is defined as "one that is not grounded 
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law." Ut. R. App. P. 33(b). As demonstrated by the Plaintiffs 
arguments, her appeal of the trial court's dismissal of her claims for failure to prosecute 
6 
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are adequately grounded in fact, even without the additional fact of the Defendants' 
counterclaim, and warranted by existing law. 
As to the Defendants' contention that the Plaintiffs Docketing Statement contained 
an error as to the number of appeals in this case, Plaintiffs counsel recognizes and admits 
that the Docketing Statement failed to state the first appeal in this case, which was 
dismissed on December 15, 1998 as a not originating from a final, appealable order. 
However, the Defendants argue that had Plaintiff reviewed the 2000 Docketing Statement, 
Plaintiff would have discovered the first appeal. An examination of the 2000 Docketing 
Statement states that there are "no prior or related appeals." Therefore, a review of the 
2000 Docketing Statement would not have discovered the prior appeal as Defendants 
contend. Additionally, case law interpreting the requirement of a Docketing Statement, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, have held that without any prejudice alleged to be 
suffered by a party for an untimely filing of a docketing statement, a dismissal for failure 
to follow the requirements are discretionary with the appellate Court. Gorostieta v. \ 
Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.2d 1110. The same reasoning could be extended to the 
incorrect listing of prior appeals—absent any real prejudice to be suffered by the 
i 
Defendants, there is actually no harm because the fact of the first appeal has been brought 
to the Court's attention. 
Utah courts have held that sanctions for frivolous appeals: 
should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, 
4 
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sanctions should be imposed when *an appeal is obviously without any 
merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and 
results in delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower court; 
increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and resources of 
the Law Court/ 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) citing Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. 
Day, 438 A.2d 234,239 (Me. 1981). The facts of this case do not constitute an egregious 
case, is taken with substantial merit and has a reasonable likelihood of success. 
Additionally, Utah court decisions which have awarded sanctions for frivolous appeals 
have demonstrated, by their particular facts, to be most egregious: Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 
(plaintiffs apparent harassment of defendant through repeatedly bringing civil actions and 
forcing her to pay substantial court costs and attorney fees) and Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 
UT 11, 67 P.3d 1000 (plaintiffs history of numerous frivolous litigation). Surely, 
Plaintiffs case does not fail within such parameters of awarding sanctions and 
Defendants' claims for such damages are inappropriate and should not be allowed by this 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court determine 
that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the Plaintiffs case for a failure to 
prosecute for a one year time period and reverse the trial court's January 7, 2004 Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice. 
8 
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Additionally, Plaintiffs argument on appeal is presented without an attempt to 
delay nor is it frivolous and Defendants' claims for appropriate sanctions should not be 
allowed. 
DATED this q& day of September, 2004. 
ROBINSON, SEILER& GLAZIER. LC 
RyanuA. Peel 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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